Sixth Meeting

Thursday, November 30, 2006

Meeting Agenda

Bill for Law Concerning Procedures for Amendment of the Constitution of Japan (submitted by Mr. YASUOKA Okiharu and four others: 164th Session of the Diet, House of Representatives Bill No. 30)
Bill for Law Concerning Initiation Procedures and National Referendums for Amendment of the Constitution of Japan and Other Important Matters of State (submitted by Mr. EDANO Yukio and three others: 164th Session of the Diet, House of Representatives Bill No. 31)

Mr. KONDO Motohiko (Liberal Democratic Party), Chairman of the Subcommittee for Considering Bills on Procedures for Amending the Constitution of Japan, reported on the proceedings and outline of the discussion of the Subcommittee concerning the two abovementioned bills.(Click here)  This was followed by supplementary comments made by members of the Special Committee who are members of the Subcommittee. After this, questions were put to the following presenters of the two bills, as well as to officials of the Legislative Bureau of the House of Representatives: Mr. FUNADA Hajime (Liberal Democratic Party), Mr. SONODA Yasuhiro (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents), Mr. KATO Katsunobu (Liberal Democratic Party), Mr. SUZUKI Katsumasa (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents), Mr. YASUOKA Okiharu (Liberal Democratic Party), Mr. HANASHI Yasuhiro (Liberal Democratic Party), Mr. OGAWA Junya (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents), Mr. AKAMATSU Masao (New Komeito), and Mr. EDANO Yukio (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents).

Subcommittee members who made supplementary comments:

Members who put questions to the presenters of the bills:

Report of the Chairman of the Subcommittee

KONDO Motohiko (Liberal Democratic Party)

I would like to report on the proceedings of the Subcommittee for Considering Bills on Procedures for Amending the Constitution of Japan and to present an outline of our discussions.

The Subcommittee met on November 16 and heard from the following informants: Mr. KOBAYASHI Setsu, Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University, and attorney-at-law; Mr. TAKAMI Katsutoshi, Professor, Graduate Division of Law, Sophia University; and, Mr. IGUCHI Shusaku, Assistant Professor, Law School, Daito Bunka University. Statements were heard from the informants concerning the Bill for Law Concerning Procedures for Amendment of the Constitution of Japan, and the Bill for Law Concerning Initiation Procedures and National Referendums for Amendment of the Constitution of Japan and Other Important Matters of State, with special reference to matters related to the Constitution Examination Board and other revisions to the Diet Law. This was followed by discussion.

I would like to present the main points of the statements made by the informants so that the contents of these statements may be shared with the Special Committee for Research on the Constitution of Japan.

Prof. KOBAYASHI Setsu expressed the following views. In addition to its powers to draft and to submit constitutional amendments, it is justified that the Constitution Examination Board is empowered to conduct research and investigations. Moreover, it is justified that the special rules for the deliberations of the Constitution Examination Board will provide for the obligation of the Board to make meetings open to the public and to hold public hearings, the non-applicability of the principle of not carrying matters over to the next session, and the issuance of recommendations by the Joint Examination Committee. Prof. KOBAYASHI advocated the following: because the public is not sufficiently informed of the fundamental problems pertaining to the Constitution, the Constitution Examination Board should function as the central organ with responsibility for building consensus, not only within the Diet but also among the people; it would be more appropriate for the Public Relations Council to be named the "Public Relations Council on National Referendums"; membership in this Council should be evenly divided between the lower and upper Houses of the Diet; and, as an aid to clarifying various points of contention on the Constitution, it would be worth considering the holding of preliminary national referendums that would function as public opinion surveys that are authorized by the Diet. Prof. KOBAYASHI expressed his opposition to national referendums on important matters of state as contained in the bill submitted by the Democratic Party of Japan on the grounds that the proposal conflicted with the principle of indirect democracy enunciated in the Constitution of Japan.

Prof. TAKAMI Katsutoshi expressed the following views. Regarding the powers assigned to the Constitution Examination Board and the examination of draft proposals for constitutional amendment, the Board is also supposed to engage in broadly based and comprehensive research on basic legislation that is closely related to the Constitution of Japan. This may place the Board at odds with existing committees. The bills contain exceptional provisions that would allow the Board to examine draft proposals for constitutional amendment even when the Diet is not in session. If this power is to be restricted to the examination of constitutional amendments, it will be necessary to justify this. The Constitution Examination Boards of the two Houses of the Diet are empowered to convene a Joint Examination Committee for the examination of draft proposals, and the Joint Examination Committee is empowered to issue recommendations to the Committees of the two Houses. However, the task of coordinating and adjusting the positions of the two Houses should be delegated to a conference committee of both Houses. The role and position of the Joint Examination Committee within the framework of the Diet Law needs to be discussed from the perspective of the principle of independence of activity, which is founded on the system of bicameralism established by the Constitution. From the perspective of ensuring the application of the provisions of the Constitution, it is desirable for the Constitution Examination Board to examine the constitutionality of basic laws. However, if this is the only function to be served by the Board, it would be enough to create a single board for the Diet. Regarding the Public Relations Council, Prof. TAKAMI advocated the following. It is inappropriate for Members of the Diet, who have voted either in favor or against initiating a constitutional amendment, to be principal agents of public relations activities, which requires fairness and impartiality. Instead, this function should be assigned to a newly-created third-party organization.

Prof. IGUCHI Shusaku presented the following argument. A national referendum merely seeks the people's approval of a constitutional amendment that has been initiated by the Diet, and the rejection of an initiative signifies nothing more than the rejection of the amendment that has been put to the vote in a national referendum. Therefore, it is erroneous to advocate, as some people have, that "the proper way of proving that those opposed to constitutional amendment are right in arguing that the great majority of the people do not desire the Constitution to be amended is to reject proposed constitutional amendments through national referendums." Prof. IGUCHI expressed the following views. Initiatives intended to close the gap between the wording of the Constitution and contemporary realities will only result in meaningless national referendums. The people should be given a broad range of choices by empowering minority parties to submit and to revise proposed constitutional amendments. Prof. IGUCHI also stated the following. He supports the principle of the separate initiation of individual amendments insofar as no issues unrelated to any given initiative are appended. It is unclear why access to free opinion advertising in national referendums should be restricted to political parties, and he has doubts and reservations concerning this system. While he is not necessarily opposed to the enactment of procedural law for constitutional amendment, he does not favor its enactment because, under current conditions, such a law would lead to erroneous theories on the Constitution and national referendums. Amendment of the Constitution should be undertaken within the framework of contemporary political and social realities, and should not be attempted merely for the reason that the Constitution is thought to be imperfect.

In light of the views expressed by the informants, discussions and an active exchange of views was undertaken among Subcommittee members and informants.

[Mr. KONDO Motohiko, Chairman of the Subcommittee, continues his report.] I would like to comment in greater detail concerning the main subject of this session, which covered matters related to the Constitution Examination Board and other revisions to the Diet Law. First of all, on a general note, doubts were expressed concerning the advisability of using a single piece of legislation to create a national referendum system for constitutional amendment as well as to revise the Diet Law on matters related to the initiation of an amendment. On the other hand, an informant argued that the question of where to start the process of creating the necessary series of procedures for constitutional amendment was irrelevant.

Regarding the question of whether the Constitution Examination Board should be established as a permanent organ of the Diet, some expressed doubts on the advisability of creating a permanent organ on the grounds that, under the principles of constitutionalism, Members of the Diet were given the obligation to respect and uphold the Constitution. Others argued that the establishment of the Constitution Examination Board as a permanent organ with powers to review and examine proposed constitutional amendments did not contradict the principles of constitutionalism and the obligation to respect and uphold the Constitution, but was rather consonant with democratic principles and the inclusion of Article 96 in the Constitution.

Regarding the process of deliberating upon proposed constitutional amendments in the Constitution Examination Board and elsewhere, presenters of the bill submitted by the ruling parties made the following three statements. First, after the end of the term of the Research Commission on the Constitution, the present Constitution should be thoroughly researched with the intent to amend it. Second, the Constitution Examination Board should dedicate itself to researching the Constitution and basic laws during at least the first two years of its existence, during which time a moratorium would be placed on its powers of initiating constitutional amendments, and that these provisions should be written into the supplementary provisions of the bills under consideration. Third, haste should be avoided in initiating amendment procedures even after the two-year moratorium period.

Regarding the pros and cons of holding preliminary national referendums on constitutional amendment, presenters of the bill submitted by the ruling parties commented favorably on the holding of preliminary national referendums at a time when the discussions conducted after the term of the Research Commission on the Constitution have taken concrete shape.

In response to this, presenters of the bill submitted by the Democratic Party of Japan made the following two statements. First, the holding of preliminary national referendums provides an additional reason for the establishment of a general national referendum system. Second, the Democratic Party of Japan intends to hold party discussions on restricting the scope of questions to be submitted to general national referendums to matters pertaining to the Constitution, and that thought is being given to adopting greater flexibility to the available options.

The following views were expressed on some more specific issues. First, discussion was conducted on empowering the Constitution Examination Board to examine basic laws that are closely linked to the Constitution and the relation of this power to the powers of other committees. Views were expressed in support of establishing a Constitution Examination Board apart from existing standing committees and empowering the Board to examine the Constitution and basic laws that are closely linked to the Constitution from the perspective of constitutional amendment. Those voicing opposition argued that various existing committees are routinely engaged in researching the Constitution, and these arrangements were sufficient.

The possibility that the Constitution Examination Board may in the future be empowered to examine the constitutionality of laws was discussed. Regarding this issue, the presenters of the ruling parties' bill and presenters of the bill submitted by the Democratic Party of Japan expressed the following views. The only powers given to the Constitution Examination Board in the present bills are the powers to deliberate upon and initiate constitutional amendments, and the powers to examine the Constitution and basic laws that are closely linked to the Constitution. However, in the future, the Board could possibly be assigned the powers of examining the constitutionality of laws, as seen in the case of various foreign countries.

Regarding the Joint Examination Committee and its power to issue recommendations, an informant expressed the following views. If it is assumed that when the two Houses of the Diet are unable to reach a consensus the Joint Examination Committee works to adjust the differences and issues recommendations covering those matters on which it has been able to develop a consensus, then this arrangement is problematic in light of the Constitution's principle of bicameralism, which prescribes that questions before the Diet are to be deliberated upon twice from different perspectives.

Presenters of the bill submitted by the Democratic Party of Japan responded as follows. As a practical matter, the drafting of a constitutional amendment will be done by the Joint Examination Committee of the two Houses. The draft would then be submitted to each House for thorough discussion. This arrangement was adopted because it constitutes the only realistic process. Presenters of the ruling parties' bill indicated that they were of the same opinion.

Regarding the pros and cons of including provisions mandating the convening of a conference committee of both Houses when a proposed constitutional amendment has been rejected in one of the Houses of the Diet, an informant expressed the following views. Article 96 does not recognize the priority of the House of Representatives. Therefore, when a proposed constitutional amendment has been rejected by one of the Houses, this should be taken to signify failure to initiate the amendment.

Presenters of the ruling parties' bill responded to this argument as follows. The purpose of a conference committee of both Houses is to coordinate and adjust the positions of the two Houses on any matter on which the Diet must take a vote. This function exists apart from any consideration of the priority of the House of Representatives. The possibility of the two Houses voluntarily consulting to reach a consensus on matters related to a constitutional amendment should not be rejected.

Regarding the meaning of "matters that are related in content" in determining the scope of an initiative, the following doubts were expressed. Depending on how this phrase is interpreted, situations may arise in which the will of the people is not properly reflected.

An informant responded that "matters that are related in content" is interpreted to mean that the individual points of amendment contained under a single initiative must be organically related. There is no way to explicitly specify in the wording of the law what constitutes relatedness. Therefore, this question calls for a political judgment.

Regarding the re-initiation of a constitutional amendment that has been previously rejected in a national referendum, the view was expressed that the re-initiation of such a constitutional amendment was unthinkable. On the other hand, an informant argued that re-initiation should be allowed in the following instances. As in the case of the Diet's principle of disallowing re-deliberation of a bill previously rejected in the same session, re-initiation should be allowed when the content of a proposed constitutional amendment has been changed, or when pertinent conditions have changed.

As chairman of the Subcommittee, my impressions of this meeting are as follows. In this, the third meeting of the Subcommittee, we focused our attention on revisions of the Diet Law, which previously had not been discussed extensively. I believe that our discussions, with the participation of informants, contributed significantly to deepening our understanding of these matters.

The procedures for the amendment of the Constitution of Japan must be designed to appropriately reflect the will of the people in whom sovereignty resides. There was shared awareness among the members of the Subcommittee that, in order to achieve this objective, it is essential that appropriate Diet procedures be adopted for the initiation of constitutional amendments to be submitted to national referendums.

Special note must be made of the very significant concession made by the presenters of the ruling parties' bill during this session. In the interest of moving forward on the procedures for constitutional amendment with the understanding of the public, the presenters stated that they were prepared to add the following supplementary provisions to their bill: a moratorium shall be placed on the initiation of constitutional amendments during the first two years of the existence of the Constitution Examination Board, and the Board shall dedicate itself to researching the Constitution and basic laws during this period. Moreover, at the end of the two years, the Board shall avoid haste in initiating amendment procedures.

Another important step forward for future discussions was made during this session with regard to the establishment of a general national referendum system, a point of contention between the bills submitted by the ruling parties and by the Democratic Party of Japan. In the course of the discussions, presenters of the bill submitted by the Democratic Party of Japan stated that they intended to hold party discussions on restricting the scope of questions to be submitted to general national referendums to matters pertaining to the Constitution.

The ultimate objective is to ensure that constitutional amendments initiated are in line with the will of the people in whom sovereignty resides. I am convinced that we will be able to reach a consensus through a process of consultation to which all members of the Special Committee contribute their wisdom based on their awareness of the importance of creating appropriate rules for the discussion of Members of the Diet as representatives of the people.

The main subject of this session was the "Constitution Examination Board and other revisions to the Diet Law." I believe this subject covers some very important issues related to the procedures for initiating constitutional amendments to be submitted to the judgment of the people. In light of the discussions conducted by the Subcommittee, I would like to ask this Special Committee to further deepen its discussions of the legislative bills before it.

This concludes my report.

Main points of statements by Subcommittee members making supplementary comments

FUNADA Hajime (Liberal Democratic Party)

>> Prof. KOBAYASHI stated that the Constitution Examination Board should function as the central organ with responsibility for building consensus on constitutional matters, not only within the Diet but also among the people. We should take note of this statement. In the case of foreign countries, we have seen that initiatives tend to be rejected in national referendums when the public does not have sufficient understanding of the issues on hand. Therefore, the Constitution Examination Board should play a major role in building public consensus and in informing the public.

>> Prof. KOBAYASHI stated that a preliminary national referendum which would function as one form of authorized public opinion survey could be helpful in clarifying various points of contention on the Constitution. Given that the results would effectively be binding on the Diet, the treatment of such preliminary referendums poses some difficulties. On the other hand, preliminary referendums could be helpful in gauging the will of the people. For this reason, I would like to further consider this option when discussing the management of the Constitution Examination Board.

>> Prof. TAKAMI stated that it would be desirable for the Constitution Examination Board to be empowered to examine the constitutionality of basic laws that are closely linked to the Constitution of Japan. I agree with this position. However, I do not think that this matter should be written into the law. Instead, the granting of this power should be carefully discussed by the political parties.

>> As I have previously stated, the Constitution Examination Board should not immediately embark on examining proposed constitutional amendments. Rather, for at least two years, the Board should dedicate itself to researching the Constitution and other laws. I believe that these matters should be written into the supplementary provisions of the bill. However, in the interest of gaining widespread public understanding, I would like to move toward extending the moratorium to allow three years' research.


SONODA Yasuhiro (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> A statement was made to the effect that a moratorium would be placed on the examination of constitutional amendments by the Constitution Examination Board for the first two to three years. During this period, emphasis should be placed on further research on the Constitution, and the time should be used effectively to create a common understanding, both within the Diet and among the people.

>> I believe that some form of general national referendum system is necessary. However, I intend to hold discussions in our party as to whether adjustment between the position of the Democratic Party of Japan that the will of the people should be taken into account in making decisions on important matters of state and the criticism that this contradicts the constitutional principle of indirect democracy can be made by restricting the scope of general national referendums to matters pertaining solely to the Constitution.

>> I believe that, in the course of discussing the Constitution, the power of the Constitutional Examination Board to examine basic laws that are closely linked to the Constitution will also extend to laws that are related to the Constitution. However, these powers will not extend to the right of drafting specific legislation, which is granted to standing committees.

>> The Joint Examination Committee is not intended to function as a forum for coordinating and adjusting the positions of the two Houses. Rather, the assumption is that the Joint Examination Committee will draft constitutional amendments in a non-partisan way. I believe the two Houses will be able to engage in thorough discussions based on the common understanding that emerges from the recommendations of the Joint Examination Committee.

>> Some are concerned that if the Constitution Examination Board were to be established as a permanent organ, this would lead to the submission and examination of constitutional amendments. However, I am hopeful that the Constitution Examination Board will function appropriately in accordance with the Article 96 provisions on constitutional amendment and the Article 99 provisions on respecting and upholding the Constitution, and that it will in this way fulfill its responsibility in consensus-building within the Diet and among the people.


AKAMATSU Masao (New Komeito)

>> The majority of views recorded in the report of the Research Commission on the Constitution summarizing five years of research favor amending the Constitution. One year and seven months have passed since the report was released, but all discussions of how the Constitution of 1946 should be amended remain shelved. In light of this fact, I am made painfully aware of the need for a permanent organ charged with the responsibility of presenting to the people the points that are at issue in the Constitution.

>> After the legislation that we are currently discussing is enacted, we will need to establish a concrete forum and timeframe for presenting to the people the points of issue on how the Constitution should be amended. However, I am not proposing that the functions of the Constitution Examination Board be divided between two separate timeframes. Rather, these functions should be carried out by an organization that bears a different name from the Constitution Examination Board. I hope that this will be taken up in our future discussions.

>> The research on the Constitution that precedes the examination of proposed constitutional amendments should be undertaken with great care and caution. I feel that two years is too short a period for this and that no time limit should be set on this research.

>> Prof. KOBAYASHI stated that preliminary national referendums are worth considering. I think that the use of preliminary referendums could be considered as a means to gauging the people's views on the direction of constitutional amendment.


KASAI Akira (Japanese Communist Party)

>> Establishing the Constitution Examination Board as a permanent organ empowered to research and examine proposed constitutional amendments is problematic from the perspective of the principle of constitutionalism. I agree with the statement made by Prof. IGUCHI that it is unnecessary to establish the Constitution Examination Board as a permanent organ.

>> Regarding the scope of individual initiatives, not all related matters can be bundled together. For instance, it would be inappropriate to combine a question on the constitutional standing of the Self-Defense Forces with a question on their overseas activities under a single initiative. Prof. IGUCHI stated that abstention from voting on such types of inappropriate initiatives should be assigned a certain significance. I believe this to be very important point.

>> Prof. TAKAMI and Prof. IGUCHI both stated that as the initiator of constitutional amendments, it would be inappropriate for the Diet to be given principal responsibility for public information activities, which require fairness and impartiality. Due gravity should be given to these statements.

>> The report of the Chairman of the Subcommittee contains such phrases as "shared awareness of the members of the Subcommittee" and "convinced that we will be able to reach a consensus." I would like to reiterate that the Japanese Communist Party takes the position that a procedural law for constitutional amendment is wholly unnecessary, and that we are not by any means participating in the deliberations for the purpose of developing a shared awareness or consensus.

>> The purpose of revising the Diet Law is to enable and facilitate a constant process of research and examination for constitutional amendment. The idea is to create an organ within the Diet that is empowered to draft constitutional amendments at any time it wishes, and to mobilize the Joint Examination Committee and the conference committee of both Houses to ram these amendments through toward a two-thirds majority in both Houses. This approach to constitutional amendment contravenes the principle of bicameralism and the intent of Article 96.


TSUJIMOTO Kiyomi (Social Democratic Party)

>> The Diet Law prescribes the internal rules of the Diet, while the national referendum law prescribes rules that are external to the Diet and which pertain to the public space. The two sets of rules differ essentially in character, and it is problematic to bring them together under a single bill.

>> I feel very uncomfortable with the structure of such bills because their series of related institutions were designed in reverse to fit the conclusion that the "Constitution needs to be amended." Prof. IGUCHI stated that essential differences existed between the initiation and ratification of a constitutional amendment, and he expressed concern with the attempt to bring these two elements together under a single law. These comments should be accepted earnestly.

>> We find that even our informants, who are experts in this field, are not informed of why the bills before us contain exceptional provisions for the examination procedures of the Constitution Examination Board. This situation is highly problematic.

>> Each initiative should cover a single question. Prof. IGUCHI pointed out that national referendums are meaningless as a means to prove that the people do not desire to amend the Constitution. Prof. KOBAYASHI stated that not enough had been done to research and to educate the public concerning the basic issues of the Constitution. These are highly important points.

>> We should continue discussing the bills before us while considering their political impact and historical significance. In particular, regarding the partial revision of the Diet Law, even the presenters of the bills have expressed caution. I found our discussions with the informants to be extremely useful.


Members who put questions to the presenters of the bills and main points of their questions:

OCHI Takao (Liberal Democratic Party)

(To the presenters of the bills submitted by the ruling parties and the Democratic Party of Japan)

>> The presenters of the bills have suggested a two to three year moratorium on the examination of proposed constitutional amendments. I believe this to be a valid approach to building consensus in the Diet and among the people. How should we deepen our discussions and reach a decision on the duration of the moratorium?

>> What role will the Joint Examination Committee play in the drafting stage of a constitutional amendment? Can you provide a conceptual image of its role?

(Comment)

>> The presenters of the ruling parties' bill have expressed willingness to consider the adoption of preliminary national referendums on constitutional amendment after the establishment of the Constitution Examination Board. The presenters of the bill submitted by the Democratic Party of Japan have expressed willingness to consider restricting the scope of general national referendums to matters related to the Constitution. We must deepen our discussions of these issues.


NAKAGAWA Masaharu (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

(Comment)

>> One of the differences between the two bills concerns the question of whether or not to adopt a general national referendum system. I believe such a system should be adopted in light of the fact that national referendums and local referendums are used in foreign countries to complement the institutions of indirect democracy.

(To the presenters of the bill submitted by the Democratic Party of Japan)

>> What was your intent in including a general national referendum system in the procedural law for constitutional amendment that you have proposed?

>> I believe it would be acceptable for the results of general national referendums to be legally binding. In your bill, why are the results not legally binding?

>> In your proposal, the initiation of a general national referendum requires a simple majority, not a super-majority. What constitutional grounds are there for adopting such an interpretation?

(To the presenters of the bill submitted by the ruling parties)

>> I believe that a general national referendum system does not constitute the adoption of a system of direct democracy, but rather that the system would serve as a means to complement indirect democracy by facilitating the direct participation of the people. What specific reasons do you have for opposing a general referendum system?


FUKUSHIMA Yutaka (New Komeito)

(To the presenters of the bills submitted by the ruling parties and Democratic Party of Japan)

>> Prof. KOBAYASHI pointed out the importance of gaining the public's understanding on matters related to the Constitution. How should we go about deepening the people's understanding of the constitutional debate? And, what form should the Constitution Examination Board take to serve this purpose?

>> One of the functions of the Constitution Examination Board is to examine "basic laws that are closely linked to the Constitution." What is the scope of laws that you have in mind? And, what aspects of these basic laws are you proposing to examine?

>> Regarding the Public Relations Council, some have said that Members of the Diet should themselves undertake the task of educating the public on proposed constitutional amendments. How should minority views be reflected in the Public Relations Council? I would like to know your thinking on these two issues.


KASAI Akira (Japanese Communist Party)

(To the presenters of the bills submitted by the ruling parties and Democratic Party of Japan)

>> What reason is there for establishing the Constitution Examination Board as a permanent organ? Regarding research on basic laws, this can be done satisfactorily by existing committees. It should be enough to form a special committee when and if the people find it necessary to amend the Constitution.

>> Regarding recommendations of the Joint Examination Committee, the presenters stated that if constitutional amendments were to be drafted by one of the Houses of the Diet, this would affect the prestige of the other House. Therefore, they stated, the bills presume that amendments will be drafted by the Joint Examination Committee. Do you not think it is inappropriate to take into account partisan considerations and prestige when dealing with constitutional amendment?

>> The bills contain provisions concerning a conference committee of both Houses, which the presenters of the ruling parties' bill claim to be acceptable for the purpose of coordinating and adjusting the positions of the two Houses. What constitutional grounds do you have for including a conference committee in the drafting process? Do you not think that the inclusion of provisions pertaining to a conference committee that are not founded on the Constitution contravenes the intent of Article 96?


KANNO Tetsuo (Social Democratic Party)

(To the presenters of the bill submitted by the ruling parties)

>> You are proposing that the scope of individual initiatives for constitutional amendment be based on "matters that are related in content" instead of being based on the content of individual articles and paragraphs of the Constitution. What reason do you have for this?

(To the presenters of the bills submitted by the ruling parties and Democratic Party of Japan)

>> I would like to ask about the procedures for deliberating upon constitutional amendments as proposed in the two bills. If the second House to deliberate upon a proposed constitutional amendment rejects the amendment, or if the first House rejects the revisions made by the second House, then, as in the case of general legislation, a conference committee of both Houses is to be formed to formulate a final proposal. What reasons do you have for opting for such a process?

(To the officials of the Legislative Bureau of the House of Representatives)

>> The Joint Examination Committee is to be granted the very strong powers of issuing recommendations to the Constitution Examination Boards of both Houses. In the past, has a Diet committee ever been granted the power to issue recommendations to both Houses? Why do you think that no committee currently exists that has these powers?

(To the presenters of the bill submitted by the Democratic Party of Japan)

>> What is your reason for assigning to the Joint Examination Committee the very strong powers of issuing recommendations to the Constitution Examination Boards of both Houses?


ITOKAWA Masaaki (People's New Party and Group of Independents)

(To the presenters of the bills submitted by the ruling parties and Democratic Party of Japan)

>> The proposed bills cover matters related to national referendum procedures as well as Diet Law revisions pertaining to procedures for the initiation of constitutional amendments. What reason do you have for combining the two under a single piece of legislation? Furthermore, what reason is there for this Special Committee to examine the proposed revisions to the Diet Law?

>> What reason is there to establish a "Constitution Examination Board" that stands apart from other committees?

>> What specifically do you have in mind when you refer to the Constitution Examination Board conducting research on basic laws? Is there no danger that this may conflict with the powers and functions of existing committees?

(To the presenters of the bill submitted by the ruling parties)

>> Presenters of the ruling parties' bills have stated that they are prepared to include in the supplementary provisions of their bill wording to the effect that the Constitution Examination Board will dedicate itself to researching the Constitution and basic laws during at least the first two years of its existence, during which time a moratorium would be placed on the examination of proposed constitutional amendments. What time schedule do you have in mind for amending the Constitution?

(To the presenters of the bills submitted by the ruling parties and Democratic Party of Japan)

>> In your thinking, under what conditions would the Joint Examination Committee be convened? In your thinking, what kind of recommendations would it issue?

>> I would like to ask about the powers of the Constitution Examination Board. As in the case of various foreign countries, in the future, will the Constitution Examination Board be empowered to examine the constitutionality of laws? What are your views on this matter?