Subcommittee on Fundamental and Organizational Role of Politics (First Meeting)

Thursday, February 14, 2002

Meeting Agenda

Matters concerning the fundamental and organizational role of politics

After a statement was heard from Prof. TAKAHASHI Kazuyuki concerning the above matters, questions were put to him; this was followed by discussion among the members.

Informant

Members who put questions to Prof. TAKAHASHI

Main points of Prof. TAKAHASHI's statement

1. Introduction

>> As a mode of operation for the parliamentary cabinet system(*), I propose a "national cabinet system," that is, a form of operation of the parliamentary cabinet system by direct democracy, in which, in effect, the people directly choose both the policy program and the prime minister, who is the main agent of policy implementation.

Note (*): "National cabinet system" is used throughout as a translation of "kokumin naikaku-sei" which appears to stem from the French 'democratie directe' (contrasted with 'democratie mediatisee').

2. The significance of introducing a "national cabinet system"

a. Two models for distilling out a policy program
>> In terms of the relationship between the Diet and the Cabinet, Japan's parliamentary cabinet system has been seen as a system of the "balanced" type, in which the Diet has the right to pass a resolution of nonconfidence in the Cabinet, and the Cabinet has the right to dissolve the House of Representatives. Today, however, we need to understand the mechanism of the parliamentary cabinet system in terms of its relationship with popular sovereignty.

>> In the existing system, which is essentially a representative system, we have a political process in which ideas about how to respond to the diverse will of the people are distilled out to form a single policy program, primarily by means of parliamentary elections and designation of the prime minister by voting in the Diet.

>> In the operation of this process, the key question is when should the policy program be distilled out. There are two possible models: (i) one in which fundamental policies are distilled out during the election process, and both the policy program and the prime minister are chosen at the same time (the national cabinet system model); or (ii) one in which the sole purpose of elections is to faithfully reflect the diverse will of the people in the composition of the Diet, and the policy program is distilled out by the elected representatives (the mediated democracy model).

b. The national cabinet system model
>> In an "active state" like present-day Japan, strong political leadership is required to carry out active measures. Consequently, the Cabinet and the policy program it implements need to have the clear support of a majority of the public. From this viewpoint, the national cabinet system model seems more appropriate.

>> When viewed from the perspective of a national cabinet system, the reforms made so far can be assessed favorably with regard to how the Cabinet governs, but they leave something to be desired with regard to how the Cabinet is controlled. That role should be performed by the Diet, especially the opposition parties. An adequate system should be designed for that purpose, centered on the right to conduct investigations in relation to government.

3. Toward the realization of a national cabinet system

a. The election system
>> The single-seat electorate system is designed to make clear the will of the majority, because the voters choose a policy program. The proportional representation system is designed so that the composition of the Diet will faithfully reflect the diversity of popular opinion on policies. Thus, single-seat electorates are better suited to a national cabinet system.

b. The proper function of political parties
>> The role of political parties in the parliamentary cabinet system is to help govern according to the will of the people and for the benefit of the people. The important thing is that each party presents its policy program to the public and then, in response to feedback, revises the program flexibly in a direction that has majority support.

c. Public preparedness
>> It is important that the people express their will clearly in elections and the like, with the intention of forming a majority, based on an understanding of the national cabinet system.

4. The national cabinet system and the ideal form of the House of Councillors

>> Introduction of the national cabinet system would not require revision of the Constitution. However, there is a risk of the system becoming dysfunctional. This is because, although the Upper House is similar to the Lower House with regard to the system by which it is elected and the powers it possesses, and although it can take action that amounts to a resolution of nonconfidence in the Cabinet by exercising its powers over the treatment of bills, the Cabinet has no means of counteracting this, such as a right to dissolve the Upper House. Hence, in operating the national cabinet system, we should establish "constitutional conventions" that would require, for example, that the House of Councillors practice self-restraint in the exercise of its powers.

Main points of questions and comments to Prof. TAKAHASHI

OKUNO Seisuke (Liberal Democratic Party)

>> I believe that we should decide the methods of electing the prime minister and heads of local public bodies on a comprehensive basis, taking into account Japan's traditions and culture, the relationships with other systems, and so on. What are your views in this regard?

>> The Emperor engages in various activities other than "acts in matters of state." You have said in one of your papers that these other activities are nominal in nature, but I disagree. Would you like to comment?


MATSUZAWA Shigefumi (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> Am I correct in understanding that the national cabinet system which you advocate is modeled on the British parliamentary cabinet system?

>> The referendum system determines the will of the people on a particular issue directly. What would be its position in relation to the national cabinet system, in which a policy program is chosen at election time?

>> How does the national cabinet system stand in relation to the Constitution? Specifically, legally speaking, does not the provision in Article 41 that the Diet shall be "the highest organ of state power" contradict the principle of the separation of powers (executive, legislative, and judicial)? Also, Article 44 states that there shall be no discrimination with regard to the qualifications of members of both Houses and their electors, but the kinds of discrimination stipulated in the Article are largely irrelevant under present conditions. The real problem today is discrimination on the basis of where a voter lives, i.e., the difference in the weight of a single vote in rural and urban electorates. What do you think of the idea of stating explicitly in the Constitution that there shall be no discrimination on the basis of place of residence (i.e., disparity in the weight of a vote)?


SAITO Tetsuo (New Komeito)

>> Which schema is assumed by the existing Constitution: the "enact and execute" schema, in which the Diet enacts laws and the Cabinet executes them, or the "govern and control" schema seen in the national cabinet system model, in which the Cabinet governs and the Diet controls?

>> As I understand it, setting aside problems in its structural design, Israel's system for the popular election of its premier (which has now been abolished) was ideal in that the popular will was reflected in parliamentary elections and condensed in the election of the prime minister. What is your view of popular election of the prime minister?

>> In the national cabinet system, I think it is vital that the public be well-informed about the political issues. The media are an important channel for this, but what do you think is the proper function of the media?


FUJISHIMA Masayuki (Liberal Party)

>> I think there is an emerging sentiment that the prime minister should be elected in national elections, and thus Japan is drawing closer to the national cabinet system model. What do you think about this point?

>> What relationship do you think there should be between the ruling party or parties and the Cabinet (especially the prime minister, who is the head of the ruling party), and what do you think should be the relationship between cabinet ministers and bureaucrats? Also, would you not agree that there are problems in the existing bureaucratic system, and that we need to consider a dynamic system in which, for example, all the top bureaucrats are replaced when there is a change of government?

>> You pointed out that the House of Councillors has, in effect, the power to pass a resolution of nonconfidence in the Cabinet. Should we not review the appropriate form of the House of Councillors in relation to the parliamentary cabinet system?


YAMAGUCHI Tomio (Japanese Communist Party)

>> As I see it, your proposal of a national cabinet system is based on the recognition that the will of the people is not reflected adequately in current politics. Could you tell us what points you consider to be constitutional problems from the viewpoint of reflecting the popular will? >> What is the status of the national cabinet system model in relation to the Diet's position as the highest organ of state power?

>> What is the relationship between the "govern and control" schema and the separation of powers? >> Why do you think that we should maintain a parliamentary cabinet system?


KANEKO Tetsuo (Social Democratic Party)

>> In my view, a coalition government should not be reorganized by the ruling parties without an election taking place. What are your views on this?

>> In the operation of a national cabinet system, each party would be required to present its candidate for prime minister to the public at election time, but, given that coalition governments have become the norm, what kind of bearing do you think this would have?

>> What methods do you think should be used to ensure respect for minority opinions in Diet deliberations?


INOUE Kiichi (New Conservative Party)

>> The national cabinet system that you propose postulates the "govern and control" schema, in which the controlling is done by the opposition parties. However, as Japan has a dominant executive branch, I believe that the ruling parties should also have the power to control the executive. What are your views in this regard? Also, I think that the rules on party-mandated binding votes should be relaxed. What do you think about this?

>> The Constitution gives strong powers to the House of Councillors; for example, the power to designate the prime minister is given to both Houses. Should there be some form of constitutional revision with regard to these powers? If so, how should they be revised, in your view?


TANIGAKI Sadakazu (Liberal Democratic Party)

>> I think that the present combined system of single-seat electorates and proportional representation is being operated in much the same way as the old system of multiple-seat electorates. What is your assessment of the present system?

>> Are not the problems in Japan's bicameral system to be found mainly in the election system and the fact that the two Houses have comparable powers? Also, under the existing bicameral system, will it not be difficult to create customary practices of self-restraint by the Upper House as required by the mode of operation of the national cabinet system?

>> In the operation of the national cabinet system, what role do you think that Diet members who belong to the ruling party or parties should play in the Diet?


SHIMA Satoshi (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> To enable the prime minister to exercise leadership, I think that Article 65 should be revised to read "Executive power shall be vested in the Prime Minister." What is your view of this? Also, I believe that the unanimity rule for Cabinet meetings should be relaxed. What is your view in this regard?

>> The system of prior screening of the Cabinet's proposals by the ruling party is peculiar to Japan, is it not? In my view, when bills are submitted at the Cabinet's initiative, Diet members belonging to the ruling parties should also take part in amending them by asking questions in the House. What is your view of this?

>> In the event that popular election of the prime minister is introduced, what do you think will be the relationship between the Cabinet and the Diet? For example, what will be the relationship between the right to pass resolutions of nonconfidence in the prime minister and the right to dissolve the Diet?


NAKAYAMA Masaaki (Liberal Democratic Party)

>> In light of the fact that every nation's constitution contains provisions concerning national defense and security, how do you regard the existing Constitution from the viewpoint of Japan's security?


Main points of comments by members of the Subcommittee (in order of presentation)

NAKAMURA Tetsuji (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> Even if we adopt the national cabinet system, it is the duty of the Diet as the people's representatives to conduct debate on the floor between the ruling and opposition parties and thus clearly establish the points at issue, with no prior screening of the Cabinet's proposals by the ruling parties, and with relaxed rules as regards party-mandated binding votes.


OKUNO Seisuke (Liberal Democratic Party)

>> The Research Commission should investigate and reach a conclusion regarding the situation of Japan when the existing Constitution was enacted, for example, the fact that the government's draft of the Constitution was drawn up on the basis of MacArthur's three principles, and the fact that under the Occupation there was prior censorship of the press. Further, in light of the changes in the situation since that time, we should review the Constitution in line with the debate over a vision for Japan in the future.


SHIMA Satoshi (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> The Research Commission has already discussed the process by which the Constitution was enacted, and our discussions should be in keeping with the times. I understand that Mr. Nakayama Masaaki of this Subcommittee has called on Prime Minister Koizumi for the release of permanently classified documents related to the fact that the Constitution was imposed on Japan by the United States. Should not such matters be debated internally by the Liberal Democratic Party?


NAKAYAMA Taro (Liberal Democratic Party; Chairman of the Research Commission)

>> Articles 79 and 80 state that the compensation of judges cannot be decreased during their terms of office. I would like this Subcommittee to examine the significance of the fact that judges' compensation is guaranteed, while there is no equivalent provision for other civil servants.


YAMAGUCHI Tomio (Japanese Communist Party)

>> When one considers that, although the present Constitution was drafted by the United States, that draft underwent deliberation in the Diet, and provisions including Article 9 were partially amended there, it is clear that the Constitution was enacted based on the reflections of the Japanese on the war, and one cannot say that it was "imposed."

>> From the viewpoint of reflection of the popular will that was cited by Prof. Takahashi, we should investigate the discrepancies that exist between the Constitution and reality with regard to, for example, the election system, the form of deliberations in the Diet, and oversight over the executive branch.


MATSUZAWA Shigefumi (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> I believe that the cardinal principle of a state with a democratic form of government is that the people have the guaranteed freedom and right to create their own constitution. To become a truly democratic nation, the people need to have the experience of writing their own constitution.

>> In Japan, there is a more-than-twofold disparity between the weight of rural and urban votes. I believe that democratic government will not be established until this is corrected, giving every citizen an equal right to participate in politics.


SAITO Tetsuo (New Komeito)

>> Based on Prof. Takahashi's point that the relationship between the Diet and the Cabinet has changed from the one envisioned when the Constitution was enacted, we should discuss the ideal form of a mechanism of government that can reflect the will of the people, and if necessary we should consider revisions.

>> With regard to Mr. Okuno's point concerning the process by which the present Constitution was enacted, it is necessary to elucidate the facts, but there is a need for serious debate that takes into account the role that the Constitution has played to date and the fact that it has been recognized by the people.


BANNO Yutaka (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> I believe that the popular will should be reflected in the choice of a leader, and also that the popular will should be consulted every time there is a change of prime minister. Measures should be devised to avoid a political vacuum while this is done, e.g., the adoption of electronic voting in elections.


KANEKO Tetsuo (Social Democratic Party)

>> I believe that the low voter turnout in elections is caused less by problems in the system than by the way politics is conducted, how policies are implemented, and so on. Also, I think that the low voter turnout presents a problem in terms of reflecting the popular will.

>> Respect for minority opinions in the electoral system and in the Diet is also important from the viewpoint of reflecting the popular will.

>> With regard to the process by which the existing Constitution was enacted, should we not proceed on the basis that this has already been settled in the Research Commission and we have now moved on to the next stage?


NAKANO Kansei (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents; Deputy Chairman)

>> I value Mr. Okuno's comment on the enactment process of the existing Constitution as a proposal that we should conduct debate in a forward-looking manner without placing any topic off-limits, but I would argue that there is no need for the Research Commission to debate further whether or not the Constitution was "imposed."

>> An important role of the Research Commission is to investigate the practical application of the Constitution and to identify discrepancies between the realities and the Constitution; revision may follow if it is found to be necessary on that basis.