Subcommittee on Ideal Government and Organizations (Fifth Meeting)

Thursday, July 10, 2003

Meeting Agenda

Matters relating to ideal government and organizations (relationship between the Diet and the Cabinet; people's sovereignty and ideal fundamental political organizations overall)

After a statement was heard from Prof. TAKAMI Katsutoshi and keynote statements were heard from Subcommittee members FURUKAWA Motohisa and INOUE Kiichi concerning the above matters, questions were put to them together with comments; this was followed by discussion among the members.

Informant

  • TAKAMI Katsutoshi, Senior Specialist, Politics and Parliamentary Affairs Research Service, Research and Legislative Reference Bureau, National Diet Library

Keynote speakers

Members who put questions or made comments

Main points of Prof. TAKAMI's statement

1. Understanding of the parliamentary cabinet system as compared with the presidential system

[1] Distinguishing characteristics of the parliamentary cabinet system

>> One distinguishing characteristic that is usually noted when comparing the parliamentary cabinet system with the presidential system is the comparatively weak separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches under the parliamentary system. This is most clearly demonstrated by the fact that under the parliamentary cabinet system members of parliament may also serve as cabinet members.

[2] Key criteria separating parliamentary cabinet systems from presidential systems

>> However, the key criteria separating parliamentary cabinet systems from presidential systems lie in the ability of the legislative branch to remove the administrative branch via a vote of no confidence, and in the accountability of the executive branch to the legislative branch.

>> In the U.S., the president is not responsible to the Congress, and thus the president cannot be removed from office by the Congress through a no-confidence motion and conversely the president cannot dissolve the Congress. In the U.K., when the lower house passes a no-confidence motion the prime minister must either resign together with the entire cabinet or dissolve the parliament. In Germany, the lower house needs to elect, when passing a vote of no confidence, a succeeding chancellor and this vote becomes "constructive vote of no confidence." In France, which has a semi-presidential system, when the lower house passes a no-confidence motion the prime minister offers his resignation to the president, who then has the choice to accept the resignation or to dissolve the lower house.

>> The Japanese parliamentary cabinet system is close to the British model whereby the prime minister has the right to dissolve the parliament at any time.

[3] Imperial cabinet systems

>> Under Imperial cabinet systems ministers are responsible solely to the monarch himself. The Meiji Constitution adopted this type of Imperial cabinet system.

>> The Chapter 5 stipulations of the present Constitution, which clearly prescribe the joint responsibility of the Cabinet to the Diet, were adopted as a result of reflection on the problems with the Imperial cabinet system of the Meiji Constitution.

2. Bicameral system; friction between the upper house and the parliamentary cabinet

[1] Role of the upper house, and nations with unicameral systems

>> In non-federal nations with democratic second houses, the very existence of the upper (second) house dictates a system of friction between the two houses. The strengths of the unicameral system, which supports efficient and swift deliberations and policy decisions, are viewed as weaknesses by the supporters of the bicameral system.

>> Overseas, many nations have unicameral legislatures, but aside from China nations with large populations almost all have bicameral legislatures.

[2] Canada's upper house and Japan's bicameral system

>> In Canada, where members of the upper house are appointed by the Governor General, there was a change of government in the mid-1980s which led to rising tension between the two houses. During this conflict, the lower house stressed its democratic legitimacy as a directly elected body, while the upper house emphasized its constitutional authority and ability to prevent the passage of "bad" laws.

>> In Japan, where the Upper House is elected by popular vote, the question of how to stipulate the role of the Upper House as based upon electoral democracy has been under debate ever since the Constitution was enacted.

Main points of the keynote statement by Mr. FURUKAWA

1. Regarding the Separation of Powers

>> The Constitution of Japan has no provisions stipulating the separation of powers analogous to Article 20(2) of the German Basic Law, and so the separation of powers in Japan has merely been inferred from the individual provisions governing the Diet, the Cabinet and the judiciary.

>> This has resulted in (a) debates regarding the meaning of the Article 41 stipulation that the Diet shall be the "highest organ of state power," and (b) such constitutional interpretations as the understanding that every effort should be made to eliminate political influence from government administration.

>> To avert such unnecessary confusion and arbitrary constitutional interpretations and applications, it would be highly desirable to incorporate a clear stipulation of the separation of powers, which also gives consideration to local self-government and independent quasi-judicial bodies, into the Constitution.

2. Establishment of a prime minister-led parliamentary cabinet system

>> The stipulations of the Constitution of Japan call for a parliamentary cabinet system that is led by the prime minister. Despite this, the disjunction and separation of the equation whereby the Cabinet = the executive and the Diet = political leadership is accepted as a matter of course; the government is run in line with the interpretation that the Constitution demands every effort should be made to eliminate political influence from government administration; the powers of the prime minister are severely restrained by Cabinet meetings, which are not stipulated by the Constitution; and thus political leadership is greatly limited (the system is led by the bureaucracy).

>> To realize a prime minister-led government administration, the Constitution, Cabinet Law and other legislation should be reviewed, taking into consideration that (a) executive powers, which are vested in the Cabinet under the present Constitution, are in fact the executive powers to direct and supervise the government administration (bureaucracy), for political purposes and (b) that these executive powers are vested in the prime minister, and that the position of the other state ministers is only as an organ to assist and advise the prime minister.

>> We need to adopt such measures as strictly limiting interference in administration matters by Diet Members who do not belong to the Cabinet to eliminate the dual structure of the ruling party and government, secure unitary administration of the Cabinet, and clarify responsibilities.

3. Redefining the "highest organ of state power"

[1] The Diet's functions in controlling executive powers and raising points of dispute

>> In contemporary society the political center should be viewed as lying in the Cabinet, which comes into contact with diverse information, is in a position to integrate required policy measures, and can act swiftly under unified and consistent policy guidelines.

>> Meanwhile, the two key roles of the Diet become (a) exercising control over the policy making, which is led by a strong prime minister, and (b) holding deliberations to raise the points of dispute to the people, under the assumption that it is the people who control affairs of state via the Diet. The definition of the Diet as the "highest organ of state power" needs to be revised in this manner.

[2] The ideal bicameral system and role of the House of Councillors

We need to examine boldly revising the nature of the House of Councillors so that, for example, (a) ministers of state [Cabinet members] will no longer be appointed from the House of Councillors, (b) there is a clear division of roles between the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors (for example, whereby the House of Representatives is responsible for debating the budget and the House of Councillors for supervising the settlement of accounts), and (c) the system for selecting Members gives consideration to regional representation and other factors.

4. Constitutional Position of Political Parties

>> Considering the important position and role of political parties whereby political parties play an indispensable role in contemporary politics, the status of political parties should be stipulated by the Constitution, and the Diet should enact a political parties law.


Main points of the keynote statement by Mr. INOUE

1. Perspective of examining systems administration and reform

>> Since the present Constitution was promulgated, major changes have occurred in Japanese society, economy, security arrangements and citizens' consciousness, and Japan's status has risen in the international community. Accordingly, we need to promptly tackle pressing issues and to implement major systems reforms in all different fields.

>> The present governing structure is well arranged as a system, and the problems may be viewed as lying with the administration of this system.

2. The parliamentary cabinet system

>> Many are now calling for strengthening the functions of the Cabinet given the needs to (a) implement radical and flexible responses to pressing issues, (b) clarify the loci of responsibility, (c) realize political leadership driven policy implementation, (d) overcome the dual nature of the government and the ruling party so that the prime minister can exercise clear leadership, and (e) adopt a political appointment system through a staged introduction. On the other hand, there would be many problems with introducing a public election system for selecting the prime minister, especially in terms of the relations with the legislative branch and the potential for "mob rule."

>> It will also be necessary to strengthen the functions of the Diet in line with strengthening the functions of the Cabinet. Under this approach, assuming that the ruling party and the government will uphold and advance government policy as one body and that the opposition parties will provide the checking function, we should consider (a) improving and expanding committee deliberations, (b) reinforcing the functions of Diet staff, (c) overcoming boycotts and the forced passage of bills, (d) improving the ability of senior vice-ministers and parliamentary secretaries to deal with interpellations, (e) redefining the form of question time, and (f) making more use of preliminary research, etc. Additionally, from the perspective of the unification of the government and the ruling party, we should maintain the system of prior screening of bills by the ruling party.

>> In parliamentary democracies, political parties play an indispensable role in ensuring that the will of the people is reflected in the political realm. Accordingly, the status of political parties should be clearly stipulated in the Constitution, and political parties should be given the necessary support.

3. The bicameral system

>> Under our present parliamentary cabinet system, political parties inevitably gain control not only over the House of Representatives but also the House of Councillors. Since (a) the House of Councillors has few instances in which it can exercise its independence, (b) there are no fundamental differences between the ways in which the Members of the two Houses are elected, (c) there is little basis for adopting a bicameral system, and (d) there are many negative factors when the two Houses render different judgments, Japan should switch over to a unicameral system or the House of Councillors should be transformed into an advisory body comprising representatives of different vocations, etc.

4. Elections

>> Considering the function of elections in reflecting the collective will of the people, Japan should switch over to a single-seat electorate system under which changes of government among 2-3 large political parties would be possible. At that time, it will also be necessary to rectify the present discrepancies in the weight of individual votes.

5. The authority to review the constitutionality of legislation and the Diet

>> The most appropriate approach is to establish a constitutional court within the Diet and give it the authority to hear any disputes regarding the constitutionality of acts of government.

6. Passage of bills

>> The [House of Representatives] special majority system for passing bills a second time [when the House of Councillors reaches a different decision] stipulated in Article 59 paragraph 2 of the Constitution should be eliminated and replaced by a conference system between the two Houses, or with a second passage by a simple majority in the House of Representatives.

>> The procedures for revising the Constitution should be changed so that amendments can be initiated by a simple majority of both Houses, or of the House of Representatives alone.

7. Crisis management

>> The authorities and other particulars of the Cabinet organization responsible for crisis management should be clearly stipulated in the Constitution.

Main questions and comments to Prof. TAKAMI, Mr. FURUKAWA and Mr. INOUE

TANIKAWA Kazuo (Liberal Democratic Party)

>> The simple stipulations on the governing structure in the Meiji Constitution left room for a range of interpretations, and brought forth the brilliant era known as the Taisho Democracy. The Meiji Constitution included no stipulations regarding the Cabinet, yet Japan's administration under that constitution included periods of party cabinet government. I think the real problems resulted from the interpretation of the Emperor as an absolute monarch by leading constitutional scholars of that time.

>> Under the Meiji Constitution, the army and navy ministers reported directly to the Emperor bringing disaster onto the Cabinet and the supreme command was stipulated independently. I understand that the role of the prime minister was strengthened under the present Constitution to remedy this, but the present Constitution lacks balance and has inconsistencies. For example, Article 73 item [4] states that the Cabinet shall "administer the civil service" while Article 72 states that the prime minister "exercises control and supervision over various administrative branches."

>> Even today, under the so-called "third reform," the government still plays the central role in social development, and I think there are real problems with this structure.

(To Mr. FURUKAWA)

>> In as much as we have a written constitution it inevitably needs to be revised to match the changing times. If we neglect this, we will eventually fall into political paralysis, and possibly even destroy the citizens' lifestyle. In this regard, I think we need to revise the Constitution just as soon as possible. What is your opinion?

> FURUKAWA Motohisa (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> I wholeheartedly agree. The conventional belief that the government will not change even if the Constitution is revised is a twisted misunderstanding of cause and effect, and has resulted in the bureaucracy taking control of the government.

>> The current Constitution uses the same Japanese term "gyosei" to translate both "executive power" and "administration," and this has invited confusion. Properly speaking, it is the Cabinet that exercises "executive power." Moreover, countries like the U.K. and Germany have nothing equivalent to Japan's National Government Organization Law. An organizational structure that cannot be rearranged by the will of the prime minister, who has "executive power," is simply odd.


NAKAGAWA Masaharu (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> While our present Constitution has a British-style parliamentary cabinet system, the actual administration incorporates various aspects of the U.S.-style presidential system, and I think this invites political confusion.

>> We should expect leadership initiative from the prime minister in times like these, when society is becoming increasingly complex and the shape of democracy is changing. Accordingly, the political system should also be reformed in a direction that will permit the prime minister to manifest greater leadership. Our system should also be supported by the pillar of "normal democracy" that gives rise to changes in government.

>> I agree with Mr. FURUKAWA's statement that "executive power" lies in the Cabinet, and we should note how this is achieved in practice in the U.K., for example, by prohibitions in principle on contact between politicians and bureaucrats.

(To Mr. INOUE)

>> From the perspective that the ruling party should enter the Cabinet and fulfil their responsibilities, the present duality between the Cabinet and the ruling party makes the locus of responsibility unclear, and under this decisions on problems confronting the state tend to be postponed. From the perspective of the ruling party, what specifically do you think should be done to unify the ruling party and the Cabinet?

(To Mr. FURUKAWA)

>> From the perspective of the opposition, what do you think about a government structure that presumes the unification of the ruling party and the Cabinet?

>INOUE Kiichi (New Conservative Party)

>> Under the former multiple-seat electorate system, factions were formed based on the situation of the electorate, and the battles to gain control over the government were among the factions rather than among different parties. With the change to a single-seat electorate system, I think party awareness and unity are increasing. Personally, I think it would be desirable to introduce a primary system for selecting candidates. While that may take some time, once a primary system is established I think it should lead to the unification of the Cabinet and the ruling party.

> FURUKAWA Motohisa (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> At present, items have to be approved by the ruling party's councils prior to Cabinet meetings, and so policy decisions are made via a duplicate route. I think that the government and the ruling party need to present a unified message to the people.

SAITO Tetsuo (New Komeito)

(To both keynote speakers)

>> Even though bills may be proposed by the government, they are actually passed into law by the Diet, and thus I would like to ask your opinions regarding the necessity of the screening of bills by the ruling party.

>> Considering the different structures of the Cabinet as an assembly of politicians and of the ruling party, also as an assembly of politicians, I think that a certain amount of coordination between the two is understandable in the course of setting policies. Do you agree?

(To Mr. FURUKAWA)

>> Under your proposed redefinition of the "highest organ of state power," are you saying that the Cabinet should be stipulated as the "highest organ of state power?"

>INOUE Kiichi (New Conservative Party)

>> I fully support the screening of bills by the ruling party.

>> My understanding of the facts differs from that put forth by Mr. FURUKAWA. I think that the old relationship between the ruling party and the Cabinet, and the relationship between ministers inside the government and bureaucratic organs, have greatly changed, and that there is no longer any duality.

> FURUKAWA Motohisa (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> The screening of bills by the ruling party is based on the assumption of a separation between the government (the bureaucracy) and the ruling party, and this clouds the locus of responsibility. Considering that the Cabinet is formed by the ruling party, that the Cabinet is "executive power," and that the bureaucracy is the administration which follows the dictates of that "executive power," any opposition between the government and ruling party is inconceivable. Your comment just now suggests that you consider the ruling party and the bureaucratic organs to be of equal rank.

>> Government policies should be set by ministers because they should bear the responsibility for them. While Diet members who are not ministers are still politicians, it is odd that policies should be determined via consultation between such Diet members (or political party committees) and bureaucrats.

>> As for my proposed redefinition of "the highest organ of state power," this just recognizes the importance of the Diet's roles in (a) exerting control over the government's decision-making process, and (b) holding deliberations to raise the points of dispute to the people.

TAKEYAMA Yuriko (Liberal Party)

(To Mr. INOUE)

>> You suggested that Japan is in the process of shifting from bureaucrat-driven to politician-driven government, but in actual practice the answers to questions and explanations in Diet committees are often presented by bureaucrats. What do you think the problems are?

>> The Japanese system of supporting Diet members with policy secretaries and other staff presently does not function well compared with equivalent systems in South Korea and the U.S. Considering this, I think the system should be improved and expanded in a public manner. Do you agree?

>> I agree with your comment that the question time system is not yet functioning properly. I think the ruling party has to give some consideration to improving the system and addressing issues like the very short amounts of time presently allotted. What is your opinion about this?

>> I also agree with Mr. INOUE'S comments that the legislative bureaus, research offices and other units of the two Houses should be integrated. Even though the political parties, especially the opposition parties, suffer from a shortage of staff and think tanks, the response of the Diet's research offices is insufficient. Please let us know if you have any concrete proposals for improving the situation.

>INOUE Kiichi (New Conservative Party)

>> The de facto ability to set policies should lie with the ministers, and I don't think that we should necessarily eliminate the practice of having bureaucrats answer questions raised in the Diet. There are various conceivable reasons as to why a politician-driven government does not function fully in Japan. The important thing is that each Diet member needs to study. To complement this, we should upgrade the policy secretary system, and the political parties should also work on their think tanks.

>> In Japan, there is definitely a shortage of staff for drafting policy. I agree with Ms. TAKEYAMA's comments that we need to improve this with official measures.

>> Considering the situation in the U.K., it is not necessarily true that the amount of time presently allocated for question time is too short. Means other than those usually adopted by the committees, such as limiting the number of participants, could also be adopted. I think this is fundamentally an issue among the opposition parties.

>> If the staff of the research offices and legislative bureaus were integrated, that should provide sufficient numbers. Some research offices are responding appropriately, and I think it's also important for Diet members to express their wishes clearly.

HARUNA Naoaki (Japanese Communist Party)

(To Mr. FURUKAWA)

>> I think the problems that Mr. FURUKAWA pointed out - (a) that bureaucrats are taking precedence over politicians and (b) the dual nature of the ruling party and the Cabinet - are not due to any shortcoming in the Constitution itself, but rather to problems with its administration. I also think that the resolution of item (a) is linked with the relative strengths of the Diet and political parties. What is your opinion?

>> When Article 41 states that the Diet is "the highest organ of state power," this is an expression of the principle of popular sovereignty. Elections ensure that the will of the people is reflected, and I think elections are the concrete manifestation of the principle of popular sovereignty. As for elections, I think (a) we should reconsider the single-seat electorate system from the perspective of reflecting diverse public opinions, (b) we need to rectify the present discrepancy in the weight of a single vote, and (c) we should lower the voting age to 18. What do you think?

(To Mr. INOUE)

>> Considering the Article 68 stipulations that the prime minister has the power to appoint and remove ministers of state, the prime ministers' powers are strong even under the existing Constitution, and this should be more than sufficient for the prime minister to manifest leadership. Do you agree?

(To both keynote speakers)

>> To really achieve a separation of politics and the bureaucracy, we will need to sever the collusion binding politicians, bureaucrats and business interests, for example, by prohibiting amakudari [golden parachuting of high-ranking bureaucrats into corporate elite posts] and corporate donations to politicians. What do you think?

> FURUKAWA Motohisa (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> Of course, some of the problems can be improved through better administration of the Constitution as it stands, but for strengthening the exercise of "executive power" by the prime minister and the prime minister's leadership, I think revising the express provisions of the Constitution would be a better approach.

>> I agree with Mr. HARUNA's points concerning the election system that (b) we need to rectify the present discrepancy in the weight of a single vote, and (c) we should lower the voting age to 18. As for his point (a) about the benefits of the single-seat electorate system, considering that only one policy can ultimately be implemented, the problem is really at what stage the will of the people is consolidated. Considering the original role of political parties in summarizing and carrying the will of the people to the policy setting process, diverse opinions should be consolidated and coordinated within party frameworks, and as a general direction I think it would desirable to move toward a system of two large political parties.

>> I think that the duality of the ruling party and the government is another reason behind the collusive ties linking politicians and bureaucrats. Only ministers and others with government posts should exercise influence over government policies. Ruling party leaders who are not serving in such positions should not exercise any such influence.

> INOUE Kiichi (New Conservative Party)

>> Systematically, it is possible even at present for the prime minister to fully manifest leadership, but I think there are problems with the administration of our systems.

>> I think the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is a separate issue from the collusion among politicians, bureaucrats and business interests.

KANEKO Tetsuo (Social Democratic Party)

(To both keynote speakers)

>> Some say that since the Koizumi administration took office, policy making is being left up to various advisory councils and the role of the Diet is diminishing. I think this trend is problematic in light of the parliamentary cabinet system. Do you agree?

>> In relation with the Constitution, in the Special Measures Law for Iraq which is being deliberated upon now, I believe that civilian control will be very important. In as much as the Diet is responsible, at the very least I think that prior approval by the Diet is needed.

> FURUKAWA Motohisa (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> I think the issue of advisory councils is a problem of administration of the parliamentary cabinet system. If the Cabinet properly controls the bureaucratic organs via political appointments and the appointment of ruling party members with deep knowledge and insight, there should be no need for such councils.

>> To manifest civil control, I think we will need to redefine "the highest organ of state power" under Article 41. It is important for the Diet to exercise control over the Cabinet; the Cabinet Legislation Bureau should be abolished; and measures should be devised to enhance the Diet's ability to render judgment on the constitutionality of legislation.

>INOUE Kiichi (New Conservative Party)

>> I think Mr. KANEKO's concerns are about the danger of a situation, like that under Prime Minister Blair in the U.K., with top-down methods whereby the prime minister alone becomes strong and the balance versus the other ministers, who are responsible for their own fields, is lost. I believe the real issue is how to retain a proper balance between the two.

>> If we are to draft a permanent law for the dispatch of Self-Defense Forces personnel overseas, I think the dispatches should require prior approval by the Diet of the basic plans, etc. In the case of the Special Measures Law for Iraq, however, I think prior approval is not required because the dispatch areas and time frames are limited and the detailed conditions are also stipulated.

Main points of comments by members of the Subcommittee (in order of presentation)

NAKAYAMA Taro, Chairman of the Commission

>> Considering that the Diet is the "highest organ of state power," I think that the right to initiate amendments to the Constitution should lie with the Diet alone, and that the Cabinet should not be given this power. Do you agree?

>> During a 2000 survey mission of European countries to investigate the conditions of their constitutions, author SHIONO Nanami, who lives in Italy, stated that the requirement for a majority of two-thirds or more in both Houses for amendments to the Japanese Constitution is too strict, and that this should be changed to a simple majority. What do you think about that idea?

> FURUKAWA Motohisa (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> I believe only the Diet has the right to propose revisions to the Constitution.

>> Many different opinions are now being expressed about the ideal provisions for revising the Constitution, and I think we should advance our discussions on this issue based on diverse perspectives.

> INOUE Kiichi (New Conservative Party)

>> I think both the Diet and the Cabinet should have the right to initiate amendments to the Constitution.

>> Because the present procedures for revising the Constitution require a national referendum, I think we should change the provision so that a simple majority vote becomes sufficient for the Diet to initiate amendments.

HANASHI Nobuyuki (Liberal Democratic Party)

(To both keynote speakers)

>> At the June 5th meeting of the Subcommittee on Ideal Government and Organization, Niigata University Associate Professor SAKURAUCHI stated that national finances should be run properly in accordance with a public accounting system, and that a multi-year government budget system should be introduced. Prof. SAKURAUCHI also stated that the Board of Audit should be attached to the Diet. What do you think about these proposals?

>> At present, the electoral systems for the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors are virtually the same, and I think this should be changed. What is your opinion?

>> Do you think that the Constitution would have to be revised for the introduction of a do-shu system [that would integrate the prefectures into a small number of states or provinces]?

> FURUKAWA Motohisa (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> I agree with Prof. SAKURAUCHI. To thoroughly prepare such a public accounting system, it is important to adjust the relations between the Diet and the Cabinet and for the Diet to serve as a mechanism to control and pursue the responsibility of the Cabinet. From these perspectives, the audit function should rest with the Diet.

>> As for the electoral system, this should be examined amid a review of the nature and functions of the House of Councillors. At that time, one possibility would be to reconstitute the House of Councillors as a body for the regional representatives based on introducing a do-shu system.

>> Finally, I think that the Constitution does have to be revised for the introduction of a do-shu system.

> INOUE Kiichi (New Conservative Party)

>> The overall fiscal system needs to be examined through diverse discussions on the settlement system, and giving consideration to the present economic conditions. As for the status of the Board of Audit, we should note the difference in conditions between the U.S. and Japan. In the U.S. the budget is drafted by Congress, but in Japan it is prepared by the Cabinet.

>> There have been extensive discussions regarding the ideal role of the House of Councillors ever since the present Constitution was enacted. However, the concrete manner in which the Upper House should be reformed is an extremely difficult problem, and because of this it has remained unchanged to this day.

>> Given the stipulations of the present Constitution regarding local self-government, I think there would be constitutional issues with having the do-shu replace the existing prefectures.

ITO Kosuke (Liberal Democratic Party)

>> Prime Minister KOIZUMI has addressed issues that were considered taboo in the past - such as reforming the postal service and the Japan Highway Public Corporation - by adopting so-called "presidential style" political methods, and this approach has been well-received by the public as easily understandable. Considering this, I think the introduction of a public election system for selecting the prime minister would enable the prime minister to act even more swiftly.

(To both keynote speakers)

>> Overseas, the number of nations with unicameral systems is overwhelmingly greater than the number with bicameral systems. I think that Japan should also adopt a unicameral system. Do you agree?

> FURUKAWA Motohisa (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> Under our present system of highly centralized authority, a unicameral system is worth considering. However, if we introduce a do-shu system and give greater autonomy to each region than a second House made up of regional representatives would then become meaningful.

> INOUE Kiichi (New Conservative Party)

>> I think we should adopt a unicameral system.

> ITO Kosuke (Liberal Democratic Party)

>> If we do maintain a bicameral system, I think that the House of Councillors should be composed of representatives who do not receive political party backing.

HARUNA Naoaki (Japanese Communist Party)

>> Under the present Constitution, Article 96 stipulates that constitutional amendments must be initiated by the Diet, and there are no provisions for having the Cabinet initiate amendments. Moreover, to enable revisions to the Constitution through such procedures advocated by Mr. INOUE, I would like to point out that it will first of all be essential to revise Article 96 itself.

(To Mr. INOUE)

>> To reinforce the functions of the Diet, it will be important to enhance Diet control over the Cabinet, for example, via more active deliberations. I think this is actually required by the Constitution. Do you agree?

>> A system for directly electing the prime minister would pose the problems of weakening party politics and concentrating power in a single individual. Mr. INOUE also expressed a negative stance toward introducing such a direct election system and I would like to ask his specific reasons for this.

(To Mr. FURUKAWA)

>> Mr. FURUKAWA, what relationship do you perceive between strengthening the authority of the prime minister and adopting a system for directly electing the prime minister?

> INOUE Kiichi (New Conservative Party)

>> Once we have reconsidered the restructuring of central government ministries and agencies, the Diet should definitely address the issue of bringing greater vitality to committee deliberations, including the issue of whether or not to establish committees corresponding to each ministry and agency.

>> As for directly electing the prime minister, the issues include whether centralizing authority in a single individual would fit in with Japanese customs, and how the relations would then be with the legislative branch. I have to be skeptical about any immediate introduction.

> FURUKAWA Motohisa (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> I think it is important to explicitly stipulate the position of political parties in the Constitution, and then to incorporate the will of the people within the framework of political parties. Also, even without introducing a system for directly electing the prime minister, as long as each political party stipulates and elects its own prime minister candidates, the people could then still select their prime minister indirectly and thus choose their government. I think that this approach would work to strengthen the leadership of the prime minister.

SENGOKU Yoshito, Deputy Chairman of the Commission

>> The era in which the policies individually advocated by each ministry and agency, and by the ministers as the representatives of these government bodies, could be smoothly linked together has come to an end. Even though we find ourselves in an era of pivotal change, it is still impossible for the prime minister and the other political powers to allocate resources on behalf of the people with the Cabinet and the ruling party acting as a unified body. If the Democratic Party of Japan takes office, we intend to strengthen the powers of the prime minister and otherwise work toward changing the relationship between the Diet and the Cabinet.

> INOUE Kiichi (New Conservative Party)

>> I partially agree with Deputy Chairman SENGOKU's comments. However, for reform it is important to determine clear targets. So rather than just conducting reform by haphazardly increasing the power of the prime minister, we should advance while gaining the assent of each Cabinet minister.

ITO Kosuke (Liberal Democratic Party)

>> At the very least Diet members should be assigned 3-5 policy secretaries to support their policy making activities. The pool of potential policy secretaries should be limited to individuals who have gained credentials by passing an examination, and their status should be guaranteed by the government. I think this issue needs to be addressed across party lines.

> SENGOKU Yoshito, Deputy Chairman of the Commission

>> I agree with Mr. ITO's opinion. In regard to this, if labor mobility does not increase, it will not be possible to improve Japanese politics. From this perspective, we should arrange a system whereby public servants and workers at private-sector firms can take leave of absence for fixed periods of time so they can serve as Diet Members' staff.

> INOUE Kiichi (New Conservative Party)

>> I agree with Mr. ITO's opinion.

> NAKAYAMA Taro, Chairman of the Commission

>> Achieving increased labor mobility is important, just as Deputy Chairman SENGOKU pointed out. I also think that the need for expanding and improving the policy secretary system is recognized across party lines. When we approach this, we will have to carefully consider such issues as retirement benefits and the individuals' status after they return to their regular workplaces.