Subcommittee on Ideal Government and Organizations (Fifth Meeting)

Thursday, May 27, 2004

Meeting Agenda

Matters concerning ideal government and organizations (bicameralism and the audit system)

After statements were heard from officials of the Board of Audit and Prof. TADANO Masahito concerning the above matters, questions were put to them. This was followed by free discussion among the members.

Officials of the Board of Audit

  • MORISHITA Nobuaki, President, Board of Audit
  • SHIGEMATSU Hiroyuki, Deputy Secretary General, General Executive Bureau, Board of Audit

Informant

  • TADANO Masahito, Associate Professor, Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law

Members who put questions to Prof. TADANO and the officials of the Board of Audit

Main points of the explanation by the officials of the Board of Audit

1. The status of the Board of Audit

>> Independence is the key to the Board of Audit's performing its duties as the nation's fiscal oversight agency rigorously and fairly from an objective and neutral standpoint. The following measures guarantee the Board's independence: (a) its right of independent personnel management; (b) its possession of rule-making powers; (c) the two-tiered system for determining its budget.

2. The relationship between the Board of Audit and the Diet

>> Although an independent agency, the Board has a close relationship with the Diet in several respects: (a) appointments of auditors require the Diet's consent; (b) the Board's statement of audit of the final accounts is presented to the Diet; (c) the Board's President appears before the Diet to give explanations; (d) the Diet can request inspections; (e) the Board provides explanations to the relevant Research Offices in both Houses. Also, the House of Councillors has requested the Cabinet to bring forward the date for submission of final accounts to the Diet to about November 20 of the fiscal year immediately following the year covered, beginning with the final accounts for fiscal 2003.

3. Reflecting the audit results

>> In order to reflect audit results in institutions, the budget, and other areas: (a) the results of the Board's audit are reported to the Diet in the statement of audit of final accounts, and they serve as important data in the Diet's review of the final accounts; (b) when the Board has requested improvement or stated its opinion on particular items, their subsequent disposition is followed and reported in the statement of audit; (c) liaison meetings are held with the Finance Ministry's Budget Bureau and other relevant departments.

4. The status of the Supreme Audit Institution in several major nations

>> The U.S. Supreme Audit Institution, the General Accounting Office (GAO), is effectively an auxiliary of Congress. Britain's National Audit Office (NAO) is a body that assists the Comptroller and Auditor General, who is an officer of the House of Commons. Germany's Bundesrechnungshof (BRH; Federal Court of Accounts) is an independent agency. The French Cour des Comptes (CDC; Court of Accounts) is an independent agency which has the character of a judicial body.

Main points of Prof. TADANO's statement

1. Introduction

>> In a bicameral system in a unitary state, the question is what distinguishes the second chamber from the first. This is especially true in the case of Japan's House of Councillors.

2. The types of bicameral system and their significance

[1] Types of second chamber: How to explain the existence of a second chamber?

>> Second chambers can be classified according to: (a) the type of state or political system; (b) the principle of representation; (c) the powers of the chamber. In practice, however, a classification that combines these three types is necessary.

[2] The functions of bicameralism: Lijphart's typology

>> In Lijphart's typology of bicameralism viewed in terms of powers and composition, Japan's system is classified as medium-strength, with the two chambers having equal powers and similar structures.

[3] Bicameral systems in unitary states: A distinct identity and (democratic) legitimacy

>> Many of the world's nations have unicameral systems. According to Lijphart, nations tend to adopt a bicameral system when their population exceeds a certain level (10 million). This may occur for empirical reasons, as there are limits to what can be achieved with unicameral representation when the population exceeds a certain limit.

>> If the second chamber has less democratic legitimacy, a system in which the first chamber makes final decisions will inevitably be adopted. This may result in frequent standoffs between the two chambers, and it is questionable whether it is appropriate to have repeated deadlocks of this kind. There is also some question as to whether having a similar partisan composition makes it more difficult for the second chamber to take on a distinct identity.

3. The principles and functions of a bicameral system: The French Senate

>> France, like Japan, is a unitary state with a bicameral system.

>> France's second chamber, the Senate, is composed of regional representatives to distinguish it from the first chamber. To give this principle concrete form, elections for the Senate are held in an indirect form which sacrifices population-based proportionality.

>> Like Japan, France has been unable to avoid partisanship in its second chamber. Nevertheless, the Senate has played a valuable role, even when the political composition of the two chambers was similar.

4. The bicameral system established by the Constitution of Japan and the House of Councillors

[1] The House of Councillors in the Constitution of Japan

>> The House of Representatives is generally said to have superiority, but the House of Councillors has strong powers, and I consider the Japanese system to fall into the equal-chambers type, as a two-thirds majority in the Lower House is required for the second passage of a bill rejected by the Upper House.

[2] Efforts to give the Upper House a distinct identity

>> In the past, the electoral system for the House of Councillors was based mainly on nationwide constituencies. The systems tried so far have resulted in the two Houses having a similar political makeup.

>> Some people argue for making the Upper House a nonpartisan "house of reason," but this is not realistic if it is to be popularly elected. Instead, we should aim for a form of party politics uniquely suited to the House of Councillors. One possible way of doing this would be to have the Upper House act only as a critic of the Cabinet, as opposed to the Lower House which would create the Cabinet, but I am somewhat skeptical as to how useful this would be.

>> For some time, beginning in the 1990s, the two Houses had different majorities. The Upper House did not always display an identity of its own, however, because its Members were included in the parties' maneuvering to win over a majority on particular votes.

>> It may not be necessary to lessen the powers of the Upper House, given that having a "strong" Upper House makes it possible to reach compromises between the two Houses and to revise bills.

[3] The significance of the House of Councillors

>> The significance of the House of Councillors is that it reflects the popular will in a different way from the House of Representatives. Although major standoffs between the two Houses are unlikely when their political composition is the same, there is always the possibility that bills may be revised in the Upper House, and this can be seen as a reflection of the diversity of public opinion.

>> The House of Councillors can be said to lack a distinct identity. But both Houses now have electoral systems that emphasize the parties over individual candidates, and it would be worth reviewing this. Also, at present the organization of the Upper House is prescribed in detail by the Diet Law, a situation that was not originally envisaged by the Constitution. A chamber that cannot decide important matters concerning its own organization by means of house rules cannot achieve an identity of its own.

[4] The role of the House of Councillors

>> The House of Councillors is expected to reflect the diversity of public opinion, carry on research activities with a long-term perspective, and exercise control functions over the government.

>> It would not be advisable to put the Lower House in charge of budget deliberations and the Upper House in charge of reviewing the final accounts, because it is doubtful how effectively the Upper House, with its weak powers, could exercise control.

5. Conclusion: Is it necessary to revise the existing bicameral system?

>> The existing bicameral system can be affirmed in terms of constitutional policy. What is needed is to put the conditions in place to enable it to function better.


Main points of questions and comments to the officials of the Board of Audit and Prof. TADANO

NAKAYAMA Taro, Chairman of the Commission

(To the Board of Audit officials)

>> In the past, little importance was attached to the Diet's approval of the final accounts, and there was quite a long time lapse before the House of Councillors could review them. Today, however, thanks in part to computerization, I think it has become possible to submit the final accounts to the Diet before the compilation of the budget, i.e., in November of the fiscal year immediately after the year covered. Is this correct?

>> About what percentage of the Board's staff have degrees in scientific or technical subjects?

(To Prof. TADANO and the Board of Audit officials)

>> As an auxiliary of the U.S. Congress, the GAO has a strong position, and its inspections have resulted in savings amounting to more than eighty times its own budget. Would it not be possible for Japan's Board of Audit likewise to carry out its inspections independently of the executive branch, from a position closely affiliated with the Diet? Also, as the House of Representatives goes first in voting on the budget, why not make use of the House of Councillor's unoccupied time to have it review the final accounts in the interim?

(To Prof. TADANO)

>> Japan has had four times as many postwar prime ministers as Germany. I think Germany's lower number is related to its system of the "constructive vote of no-confidence," whereby the Bundestag can remove a chancellor only when it simultaneously agrees on a successor. Would you like to comment on this point?


KANO Michihiko (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

(To the Board of Audit officials)

>> Some people suggest that Japan should consider making the Board of Audit an auxiliary of the Diet because of the success of the GAO, which is attached to the U.S. Congress, while others argue that its independence might not be adequately maintained. What are your views on attaching the Board of Audit to the Diet? Also, what would your position be if Japan had a presidential system of government with strict separation of powers, instead of a parliamentary Cabinet system?

>> So far, the Board of Audit has made only two reports under the system introduced in 1997 whereby the Diet can request inspections. How could this system be redesigned to make it function more effectively?

(To Prof. TADANO)

>> The reason why there have been just two reports, as I noted in my previous question, is that requests for inspection can only be made with the consent of the ruling party or parties. I think that a request for inspection should be valid as long as it has the backing of a certain number of Members. What are your views on this point?

>> Since the two Houses are elected separately, I think it is only to be expected that they should have different representational functions. What do you think is the ideal form of electoral system for the two Houses?

>> The Constitution of Japan contains few provisions regarding the electoral system; they consist almost entirely of Article 43, Paragraph 1. In contrast, the constitutions of many countries set forth explicit provisions for the main points of the electoral system. Should we provide more concretely for the electoral system in the Constitution? If so, what sort of provisions should be established?


SAITO Tetsuo (New Komeito)

(To Prof. TADANO)

>> The Liberal Democratic Party, which currently lacks a majority in the Upper House, has put together a coalition government for the sake of political stability, and in a sense I think that the House of Councillors is fundamental to this coalition government. What are your views on this point?

>> Given the existing electoral system for the Lower House, which combines single-seat constituencies and proportional representation, what electoral systems could be considered for the Upper House? Also, what do you think of the minimum age limit for candidates being different, that is, 25 in the Lower House and 30 in the Upper House?

>> The Diet creates committees that are counterparts to government ministries; this may be efficient, but it raises doubts as to whether the Diet can achieve its true function. Would you like to comment?

(To the Board of Audit officials)

>> I think there is more need for a check on waste inherent in institutions themselves, e.g., the tender system, than for a check on improper expenditures by individuals and organizations. Which of these is the main focus of your work, and what is the ratio between them?


YAMAGUCHI Tomio (Japanese Communist Party)

(To the Board of Audit officials)

>> Are there any areas in the Board of Audit's present conduct of its work that you feel need to be improved in order to ensure rigorous and fair audits from an objective and neutral standpoint?

>> Over the last few years, secret funds and other financial irregularities at the Cabinet Secretariat and the Foreign Ministry have become a major issue. What problems do you consider to exist in this area at present?

(To Prof. TADANO)

>> Am I correct in understanding you to say that the problem lies not in the Constitution's provisions for a bicameral system but in their implementation, in the form taken by actual politics, and that you think we should consider the approach of improving the implementation of these provisions in order to realize a distinct identity for the House of Councillors?

>> Also, Article 41 identifies the Diet as the highest organ of state power, the organ that represents the people. What do you think are the key points in discussing the bicameral system from the viewpoint of fully realizing the will of the people, with whom sovereignty resides?

>> With regard to the raison d'être of the House of Councillors, in your publications and in your statement today, you often use the phrase "to reflect diverse public opinion in a pluralistic way." Could you please explain this point more fully?

>> You expressed doubt about assigning the review of final accounts exclusively to the House of Councillors. The Constitution calls for after-the-fact control by the Diet in regard to the final accounts, and hence I think there would be a constitutional problem if either House had less than adequate jurisdiction over the budget and the final accounts. Do you agree?

>> In relation to self-regulation by each House, you commented that we should review the Diet Law and house rules in the light of the intent of Article 58 of the Constitution. I would like to hear your thoughts on this point in a little more detail.


DOI Takako (Social Democratic Party)

(To the Board of Audit officials)

>> Under the Board of Audit Law, the Board is supposed to have "independent status," but critics contend that it is under the Cabinet's influence and is not performing its functions adequately. Would you like to comment?

>> Isn't it difficult for the Board to maintain its independence from the Cabinet when the right to appoint auditors rests with the Cabinet and its budget is reviewed by the Ministry of Finance?

>> I am told that in the audits conducted by the GAO in the United States, the emphasis is on effectiveness. What points does Japan's Board of Audit emphasize in its audits?

>> What is the retirement age for auditors? Would you consider extending the retirement age to secure highly skilled personnel?

(To Prof. TADANO)

>> To ensure the Board's independence, surely it is important to detach from the Cabinet the authority for such areas as personnel management and the review of the Board's budget. Do you agree?


IWANAGA Mineichi (Liberal Democratic Party)

(To the Board of Audit officials)

>> The NAO in Britain commissions external audits. Shouldn't we consider doing this in Japan also?

>> I have heard that the Board of Audit hires certified public accountants for fixed terms of employment. In what areas are they being utilized? Also, what are the advantages of employing them?

>> What improvements has the Board of Audit adopted due to contacts with its counterparts overseas, such as the GAO and NAO?

(To Prof. TADANO)

>> In my view, it is not appropriate for the two chambers to have similar electoral systems. Ideally, the Lower House should consist of 300 Members elected from single-seat constituencies, and the Upper House should consist of 100 Members elected from proportional representation constituencies. Would you like to comment?

>> At present, every Diet Member works under a great deal of pressure, both in terms of time and money. An environment in which Diet Members can fully realize their abilities should be put in place by improving their working conditions, for example, by assigning more secretaries. In my view, this is another reason to change the electoral system in the way I suggested earlier, thus reducing the number of Members. What are your thoughts in this regard?


MABUCHI Sumio (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

(To Prof. TADANO)

>> In considering the ideal form of the bicameral system, besides the composition of the chambers and their electoral systems, I think we also need to take into account the fact that changes in the will of the people are reflected through careful deliberations in both Houses. Would you like to comment?

>> The Upper House, which, unlike the Lower House, neither creates nor maintains the government, is a forum for careful deliberation. Given this role, what status do you see party policy manifestos having in elections for the Upper House?

>> Do you think that the two Houses have actually achieved the ideal, namely, that they reflect current public opinion through their elections, and they provide feedback to public opinion in the form of their deliberations?

>> It has been suggested that the House of Councillors should have the specialized function of acting as a check, as a kind of "powerless House of Peers." What is your reaction to this?

>> Do you regard bicameralism as a highly evolved form of government?


FURUYA Keiji (Liberal Democratic Party)

(To Prof. TADANO)

>> I do not subscribe to unicameralism any more than you do. In thinking about the ideal bicameral system, I believe we should try to achieve a distinct identity for the House of Councillors in the area of its powers, rather than its composition or electoral system; do you agree? Also, if we were to alter the division of roles between the Houses, what kind of effects do you foresee the alteration would have on their composition and electoral systems?

>> To make decentralization a reality, we should aim to create a do-shu system. In that connection, I suggest that we could design an Upper House election system with the do-shu as a unit; would you like to comment? Also, when considering an electoral system of this kind, should we revise Article 43, Paragraph 1, which stipulates "representative of all the people"?

>> Only the Lower House has the power to pass a resolution of no-confidence in the Cabinet, but Cabinet members are sometimes pressured to resign by a censure resolution of the Upper House. As a result, partisanship has become unavoidable in the Upper House as well as the Lower, because of the need to secure a majority. In light of this situation, I think the Upper House, as a customary practice, should refrain from passing such resolutions. Would you like to comment?

>> Because of the system of Diet sessions, conditions are such that the Upper House cannot allow sufficient time for its review of the budget and bills. I believe that we should therefore consider abolishing the session system. What are your thoughts on this?

DOI Takako (Social Democratic Party)

>> Under Article 11 of the Regulations of this Commission, a quorum consists of one half of the members. This meeting does not currently meet that requirement.

> SUZUKI Katsumasa, Subcommittee Chairman

>> That is so, but I ask for your understanding.

> FUNADA Hajime (Liberal Democratic Party)

>> It is true that we do not have a quorum under the Regulations, but considering that there are members who wish to speak, I would ask you to please allow the meeting to continue.

> SUZUKI Katsumasa, Subcommittee Chairman

>> I am told that it is possible to continue with the present numbers at the Subcommittee Chairman's discretion, and accordingly I ask for your understanding.

Main points of comments by members in the free discussion (in order of presentation)

TSUJI Megumu (Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents)

>> Prof. TADANO pointed out that in the present bicameral system, the parties maneuver to form a majority in anticipation of opposition in the Upper House. I find it regrettable that the bicameral system is not functioning due to the formation of coalition governments in anticipation of the Upper House's response.

>> I believe that we should maintain the bicameral system and create a structure in which the diversity of public opinion is reflected.

>> Prof. TADANO's point that the two Houses can display distinct identities while having equal powers is an important insight.

>> As for forming a bicameral system that reflects the diversity of opinion, it is important to make the system reflect local views, given the present centralized control over government. We should think about the ideal form of bicameralism from the viewpoints of achieving decentralization and reflecting regional opinion in the nation's government.


YAMAGUCHI Tomio (Japanese Communist Party)

>> I will speak, as it is the Chairman's right to arrange the business of the Subcommittee, but I would ask the ruling parties to reflect seriously on their attendance.

>> Neither this morning's nor this afternoon's informants spoke of any need to revise the Constitution; on the contrary, they stated that we need to reform an existing situation which violates the Constitution. This is an important point. We must look at the actual situation in light of the constitutional norms as we pursue further research.

>> Given that the Constitution authorizes a bicameral system, how to ensure that the two Houses reflect the will of the sovereign people becomes the key issue. We need to take this as the basis for a serious consideration of such matters as electoral systems and the nature of deliberations in the two Houses.


FUNADA Hajime (Liberal Democratic Party)

>> It is very regrettable that attendance is especially low among the ruling parties. This is an important forum where the Constitution is discussed, and we will take care that it does not happen in future.

>> How to bring out the merits of bicameralism and differentiate between the chambers is an important question, given that Japan is a unitary state, not a federal one, and the Members of both Houses are elected political representatives. We should take full advantage of the merits of the bicameral system that has become established over the postwar period, and we should seek to maintain and improve it.

>> I suggest that it would help to accentuate the differences between the two Houses if they had completely different electoral systems, e.g., single-seat constituencies in the Lower House and proportional representation in the Upper House.

>> Thinking about bicameralism, I believe it is appropriate to give the two Houses different powers, but not unequal powers so that one is dominant. For example, I suggest that a possible approach would be to have the Lower House's role center on the budget and the Upper House's role center on the final accounts, and to locate the Board of Audit in the Upper House.

>> It is important to draw fully on the strengths and the good ideas that bicameralism offers.


DOI Takako (Social Democratic Party)

>> All the Subcommittee's members were informed of the schedule for today's meeting. For the record, I wish to note that we waited until this hour, but there is no sign of the attendance increasing.